The birth of the modern European critical tradition can be traced back to the Enlightenment and in particular the philosopher Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) critique of reason. Kant's revision of the liberal humanist tradition replaced metaphysics (speculation about external reality) with critique. For Kant, critique consisted of tracing the origins of experience back to the faculties of the mind. Stated simply, before Kant, science described the world passively, but after Kant, science was seen to write onto the world what human categories imposed upon it. For Kantians, science no longer extracted knowledge from the proverbial thing-in-itself (which remains fundamentally unknowable): rather science produced knowledge of the phenomena of the world.
Hegel's Critical Dialectic
If Kant's philosophical project can be summarized as an attempt to define a-historical categories and their functions, G. W. F. Hegel's (1770 Hegel's ( -1831 work could be seen as the interjection of time into such a system, rendering Kant's systematic absolutism into a historical organization of concepts. Whereas Kant sees the categories as timeless, Hegel sees in them a dimension of temporal unfolding through a series of immanent negations.
Thus reality is no longer static but rather dynamic and developmental. This dialectical process will become central to the future of western theories of criticism; hence we must explain what Hegel means by dialectical movement. 4 For Kant, contradictions formed a series of antinomies that were permanently irreconcilable. Yet for Hegel, contradictions are not so much problems as the motor through which concepts become increasingly more determinant. Contradictions are in fact the internal development of concepts. As such, negation is not simply destruction but is productive, leading onto ever higher levels of reason and ever more generalized and universal knowledge. In short, thinking is not simply the manipulation of preformed concepts but is a movement and a development in which what has come before is not simply abandoned to the dustbin of history but rather understood as necessary phases on the road to absolute knowledge itself.
Hegel's dialectic sought to overcome a gap that Kant initiated between the thingin-itself as a radically unknowable external object and the knowing subject. Through negation, Hegel is able to state that the object that is not a subject is an object. Seemingly redundant, this dialectical formulation proposes that the subject is at its core mediated by the object, and the object, mediated by the subject. In other words, the subject becomes objectified and the object becomes subjectified. Thus the object contains within itself its negation (subjectivity) and the subject contains within itself a negative movement towards the object, thus producing a conceptual space for critique.
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, thus teaches us how absolute knowledge is arrived at through negation, mediation, and synthesis in the necessary unfolding of contradictions of consciousness. His is a philosophy of overcoming dualisms, synthesizing, and summing up. It is a retrospective exercise that results in a new way of connecting with the past. This relationship to what has come before must be, for Hegel, complete without omissions (thus incorporating contradictions 5 as inherent rather than aberrant) and transparent (rationally organized in a series of immanent negations through which problems are solved and new problems produced). In this sense, what is more inclusive, more complete, and more transparent becomes absolute knowledge and what is not complete, transparent, and inclusive is up for critique.
Although it is arguably true that Hegel's philosophy justified Prussian oppression as well as slavery and exploitation as necessary stages in historical development, his dialectical method is also a critical tool that opened many new paths for future philosophers and social theorists. Ideas and concepts emerge as historically conditioned, and thus never totally innocent, constructs that are partial, subject to critique, and thus provisional.
Genealogy, Power, and Critique
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 Nietzsche ( -1900 , like Hegel before him, historicized Kant's version of critique through a technique called genealogy. Nietzsche argued that Kant's a priori universals are born from historical struggles between competing interests. A particular idea gains ascendancy not because it is universally valid, but rather because a particular will to power animates it. Thus Nietzsche's critical method attempts to uncover the hidden will to power behind necessary and absolute truth claims. Yet Nietzsche must be separated from Hegel on two important accounts. For Hegel, this process of historical development is a self-contained internal movement of reason towards absolute knowledge but, for Nietzsche, such movement is violent and linked with a will to power 6 that constantly attacks status quo ideas, personalities, and institutions. Second, Hegel values synthesis and the 'truth' lies at the end of the process of development, gazing back upon itself. For Nietzsche on the other hand, 'truth' lies at the beginning where terms are pure, before they are corrupted and debased by certain historical struggles between the powerful and the weak. Thus the origin rather than the summation becomes the source and fundament of critique.
Nietzsche's radical skepticism and critical force are amply on display in On the Genealogy of Morals (originally published in 1887). Here Nietzsche traces the descent of moral ideals back to their rather questionable origins. For Kant, to know the self was to understand the structure of the mind, but for Nietzsche, to know the self is to understand the legacy of war and violence carried within seemingly neutral and self-evident concepts like morality. Thus Nietzsche poses a simple question that in the end has radical implications for our self-understanding: How were the concepts 'good' and 'bad' invented? In Nietzsche's historical analysis, those who are strong willed, virile, healthy, and noble created the words that we use to describe social relations and actions. Thus the nobility invented the term "good" to describe themselves and their activities.
Opposed to the superior stood the common people. Because they were not noble, healthy, or strong, the aristocracy called them 'bad'. Yet soon there was a radical inversion of these terms, and this inversion was the result of a third class between the nobility and the commoners: the priests. The priests were, according to Nietzsche, jealous of the aristocrats and identified with the common, suffering peasants. In an act of revenge, the priests appropriated the language of the nobility and labeled the good as bad and the bad as good. The result is a slave morality that values malice, sickness, and 7 vengefulness over health, vitality, and righteousness. For Nietzsche, the result of this inversion for human evolution is tragic. As the priests led a slave revolt against the masters, the world witnessed the rise of Christianity, which is a religion of physical and moral disease.
Overall, Nietzsche is not a complete relativist. It is not simply that he is critiquing all concepts, but rather that he is critiquing those ideas that generate cultural, moral, and biological illness (such as Christian morality). Through the act of critique Nietzsche liberates himself from the constraints of limiting concepts and in the process increases his life power. By overcoming social constraints and taboos, Nietzsche strives to become the 'superman', a figure unbounded by conventions. The superman holds nothing above his or her freedom to invent, create, and cultivate great genius.
Perhaps the philosopher most widely recognized as carrying on Nietzsche's genealogical criticism is the French postmodernist Michel Foucault (1926 Foucault ( -1984 . Like Nietzsche, Foucault desires to disrupt enlightenment narratives of progress, teleology, and monumental history. For both, history is not so much a linear process as it is a chaotic and violent war of positions, full of fissures, fault lines, and radical breaks.
Genealogy as a form of critique exposes these fault lines and focuses on contingency, rather than continuity and internal necessity. Whereas Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God, Foucault, in an equally dramatic flourish, proclaimed the death of 'man' as a historical category, which like all other ephemeral things will be washed away in the sand. Also, like Nietzsche, Foucault takes a great interest in the concept of the body. For Nietzsche, the life force emanating from the body cannot be contained or controlled by slave morality or else illness will ensue. For Foucault, the body is the primary site for the 8 inscription of power relations and of resistance. Yet there are also radical differences separating the two theorists. Whereas Nietzsche is unabashedly elitist, Foucault sides with the dispossessed, the forgotten, the marginalized, and the 'abnormal'. Whereas Nietzsche's will to power is biological and highly individual, Foucault's theory of power is social and relational. Thus Foucault is not simply appropriating Nietzsche's methodology. He is also critiquing and reworking many of Nietzsche's central ideas.
Foucault provides a compelling example of the genealogical, critical method in Discipline and Punish (1979) . Here Foucault examines the rise of disciplinary power as the dominant mode of power in the modern era. Emphasizing a break from feudal society and the spectacular might of the sovereign, Foucault outlines the mechanisms, instruments, institutions and discourses that collectively function to maintain a homogenized, passified, normalized and docile population of workers/consumers. Rather than grand displays of awesome force, disciplinary power functions covertly, silently, and on the micro-level of common everyday reality. It is dispersed throughout society as a whole, functioning to train the body and the soul of individuated subjects. The perfect example of a disciplinary technology is Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. The panopticon was originally a plan for the ideal prison. In the panopticon, prisoners are subjected to the gaze of the guards who sit in a tower overlooking a circular cellblock. The prisoners themselves do not know if the guards are present in the tower or not. Thus over time, the prisoners, suspecting they are constantly under the watchful eyes of the guards, become self-regulating, internalizing the disciplinary gaze. According to Foucault, the panopticon became a generalizable principle organizing all of our major social institutions including schools and clinics. Thus, Foucault's genealogy enables us to critique normalizing power relations and pinpoint their various instruments of application. He asks the question: How do institutions both subject us to discipline and through this subjection produce us as subjects? The next question, one which Foucault himself could not fully answer before his untimely death, is thus: What are forms of resistance that enable subjects to produce themselves according to their own pleasures and desires? On this level, Foucault and Nietzsche once again meet, for both advocated a strong sense of aesthetic creativity against a mass culture of conformity.
Psychoanalysis and the Critique of Culture
Sigmund Freud (1856 Freud ( -1939 In 1929, Freud's book Civilization and its Discontents was an important foray into social and political analysis. As opposed to Kant's optimistic teleology that ends with perpetual peace and individual freedom, Freud argues that as civilization becomes increasingly complex, the pressures exerted on the individual psyche become increasingly difficult to bear. In exchange for perceived safety and security, the individual enters into a social contract, agreeing to renounce his or her instinctual satisfaction. Society fundamentally demands that limits be placed on our innate sexual desires (Eros) and aggressive tendencies (Thanatos). Sexuality is sublimated into productive work, which results in the perpetual deferral of gratification. By placing restrictions on the externalization of our aggressive drives, Thanatos turns inward, producing self-destructive tendencies in the form of an overly punitive conscience.
While this eternal struggle between individual happiness and the constraints of civilization cannot be fully resolved, Freud does suggest that civilization must begin to take into account the impact of its severe demands on our fragile psyches. As long as social demands ignore the reality of instinctual forces, civilization will inevitably produce neurotics and hysterics, as well as much unhappiness and misery. Thus Freud's work ends with a great warning, a warning that has yet to be adequately heeded.
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While there have been many revisions of Freud's theories, Jacques Lacan's (1901 Lacan's ( -1981 return to Freud is compelling and important for the history of critique. In his many seminars, Lacan utilized structural linguistics to unlock the radical kernel at the heart of Freud's theory of the subject. This linguistic turn is most succinctly summarized in Lacan's famous aphorism: 'the unconscious is structured like a language'. Here we see an interesting rejection of one of Freud's fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis: that the human psyche is composed of a dynamic relation between the somatic and the linguistic. For Lacan, the pre-linguistic imago of the unconscious is replaced by the broader category of the signifier. With these significant revisions of Freudian theory, Lacan then turns to an analysis of social relations through what he terms 'the four discourses', which include the discourses of the hysteric, the university, the master, and the analyst. These discourses articulate the structural relations between social agents and the 'other', revealing that below the conscious level of interaction there is always already operating a dimension that is repressed. Here critique amounts to the uncovering of this 'obscene' dimension below a constituted social fantasy. Deleuze (1925 -1995 ) and Felix Guattari (1930 -1992 is often viewed as a mad postmodern masterpiece. In this text, the authors argue that capitalism unleashes a massive flow of unbridled desire. Yet because desire is inherently revolutionary, capitalism at the same time must recode, or reterritorialize these very same flows. According to Deleuze and Guattari, Freudian psychoanalysis is a technology that attempts to recode desire and control it by inextricably linking desire to the Oedipal complex and the guilt of incest. For these authors, Lacan is equally an agent of capitalist territorialization. Where Lacan sees desire as a lack in the signifying chain, Deleuze and Guattari argue that desire is always productive.
As opposed to psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari propose schizoanalysis.
Here the goal is to expose the discourses, social structures, institutions, and practices that constrict desire and to open up fissures where desire can escape these recodifications.
Schizoanalysis smashes the Freudian ego and de-Oedipalizes desire itself. Because 13 Deleuze and Guattari reject notions of conformity, discipline, and homogenization, they embrace the figure of the schizo or of nomadic tribes, both of which are unbound by striated society. Here the figure of the schizo recalls Nietzsche's concept of the superman who is essentially an individual lacking the internal agent of the Oedipal complex: the punitive super-ego.
In these three cases, psychoanalysis provides many important tools of social, political, and cultural critique. From the psychoanalytic perspective we begin to recognize the tensions between the individual and society, the problematic of desire, and the role of unconscious forces in determining our perception of the world. Whether Freudian, Lacanian, or Deleuzian, psychoanalytic critique is an important tradition whose basic assumptions are constantly being revised and/or rejected by critical theorists in a variety of fields and disciplines. History for Marx is a dynamic process precisely because of the continual conflict that emerges between forms of ownership and the mode of production. For instance, in capitalism, there is a central contradiction between the individual ownership of the means of production by the capitalist class and the communal mode of production in the factories. Here, the unknowable thing-in-itself, which Kant's idealism could not adequately approach, is transformed by Marx's materialism into class struggle as the objective motor of history. In order to resolve this contradiction, the workers have to take over the means of production. Thus the truth of capitalist productivity and its promised wealth lies only with overcoming the limitations of the capitalist system with socialism.
As long as we live within a capitalist society, the class that controls the economic base also controls the production of ideas. Ideology articulates the ideas of the ruling class (individualism, profit, market logic, and the entrepreneurial spirit), transforming 15 class specific interests into common, social interests. Thus ideology acts to universalize and naturalize bourgeois ideas, and in the process conceals the fundamental and inescapable reality of class conflict. Because of its mystifying nature, ideology is conceived of as producing a false consciousness or a set of false ideas that merely act to reinforce the ruling class's dominance and ensure their position of power and prestige in the society. Therefore ideology for Marx is almost always associated with negative or pejorative connotations. Ideology is imposed upon the subjugated working class as a form of domination, preventing the working class from consciously recognizing that their objective interests stand opposed to those of the bourgeoisie.
While the basic premises of historical materialism remain largely unchallenged within Marxist debates, the function of ideology is hotly contested. For the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891 Gramsci ( -1937 , military/economic domination by a single class is not enough to maintain its position of power within a society; instead the ruling class must legitimate this rule. In order to lead the people, the dominant class cannot simply impose upon them a set of distorting and oppressive, ideologically infused ideas. The answer for Gramsci is that ideology must become common sense and is constructed in a struggle over hegemony and control between social groups. Hegemony is thus a contested terrain, a negotiated space, and a relationship of social power over subordinate groups. As opposed to Marx's concept of ideology, hegemony is not simply a false consciousness imposed upon the masses by the ruling class, obliterating working class values. In order to gain the consent of the subordinate class, hegemony attempts to take into account the needs, fears, and hopes of the populace. Put another way, hegemony must contain rhetorical constructs that attempt to persuade and convince. As such, 16 hegemony is never absolute domination of one class position over another. In summary, opposing class interests need to be addressed and rearticulated by a hegemonic political process. Hegemony thus incorporates subordinate groups into its coalition. The subordinate groups accept their inferior position without contestation, consenting to the domination of the ruling class. Put another way, they consent to be led by the ruling class. The important point here is that hegemonic power is not guaranteed simply by class position but must be won.
Struggles for hegemony take place in the realms of media culture and civil society. As Gramsci states, the press is most important weapon in constructing an 'ideological front'. Also, civil societies, i.e. churches, schools, clubs, and so on, are all sites of hegemonic struggle. In order to understand how a hegemonic coalition is being formed, Gramsci argued that media culture and civic institutions are politically charged fields of contestation. As such, Gramsci moved Marxian analysis beyond its focus on economic relations of production and into the sphere of media culture.
As we can see, Gramsci's view of hegemony is more dynamic than Marx's formulation of ideology in three very distinct ways. 1) The hegemonic social position is never absolute but must be continually constructed, maintained, and defended. Domination over ideas is never guaranteed by one's position in a system of economic production. 2) It is not purely false consciousness, but is a negotiation between a variety of voices that are stitched together into a dominant ideology that supports the ruling class agenda, and that will take different forms in different historical contexts and eras. 3) The struggle over culture and politics takes precedence in Gramsci's theory as a necessary 17 component for gaining economic power, and as such, analysis of civic institutions and media culture becomes paramount for understanding hegemonic struggles.
Another central figure in rethinking historical materialism is Louis Althusser's (1918 Althusser's ( -1990 version of structural Marxism. First, Althusser seriously complicates any reductive reading of the Marxian base-superstructure distinction. While insisting that the mode of production is determinant in the last instance, Althusser grants a certain relative autonomy to the superstructure. Here society exists in an always already complex totality from which an originary class struggle cannot be extracted. The various elements within the superstructure relate to one another in terms of a differentiated unity wherein all struggles are 'overdetermined' by a series of antagonisms (political, cultural, and of course, economic). Second, Althusser, in contradistinction to Marx's purely negative reading of ideology, argues that ideology is productive and necessary for the individual to imagine his or her relationship to the social totality. Ideology might be illusory but it is also an allusion to very real material conditions. Furthermore, ideology is, as opposed to both Marx and Gramsci, largely unconscious and embedded in our material practices. , Herbert Marcuse (1898 , Leo Lowenthal (1900 -1993 , and Erich Fromm (1900 Fromm ( -1980 produced some of the first accounts within critical social theory of the importance of mass culture and communication in social reproduction and domination 19 (Kellner, 1989) . The Frankfurt School also generated one of the first models of a critical cultural studies that analyzes the processes of cultural production and political economy, the politics of cultural texts, and audience reception and use of cultural artifacts. Moving from Nazi Germany to the United States, the Frankfurt School experienced at first hand the rise of a media culture involving film, popular music, radio, television, and other forms of mass culture. In the United States, where they found themselves in exile, media production was by and large a form of commercial entertainment controlled by big Victims of European fascism, the Frankfurt School experienced first hand the ways that the Nazis used the instruments of mass culture to produce submission to fascist culture and society. While in exile in the United States, the members of the Frankfurt School came to believe that American 'popular culture' was also highly ideological and worked to promote the interests of American capitalism. Controlled by giant corporations, the culture industries were organized according to the strictures of mass production, churning out mass-produced products that generated a highly commercial They argued that the system of cultural production dominated by film, radio broadcasting, newspapers, and magazines, was controlled by advertising and commercial imperatives, and served to create subservience to the system of consumer capitalism.
While later critics pronounced their approach too manipulative, reductive, and elitist, it provides an important corrective to more populist approaches to media culture that sphere and transformed it from a site of rational debate into one of manipulative consumption and passivity. In this transformation, 'public opinion' shifts from rational consensus emerging from debate, discussion, and reflection to the manufactured opinion of polls or media experts. For Habermas, the interconnection between the sphere of 24 public debate and individual participation has thus been fractured and transmuted into that of a realm of political manipulation and spectacle, in which citizen-consumers ingest and passively absorb entertainment and information. 'Citizens' thus become spectators of media presentations and discourse which arbitrate public discussion and reduce its audiences to objects of news, information, and public affairs.
Habermas's critics however, contend that he idealizes the earlier bourgeois public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in fact the proletariat, many social groups, and most women were excluded (see the essays in Calhoun, 1992) . These critics contend that Habermas neglects various oppositional working classes, plebeian, and women's public spheres developed alongside the bourgeois public sphere to represent voices and interests excluded in this forum. Yet
Habermas is right that in the period of the democratic revolutions a public sphere emerged in which for the first time in history ordinary citizens could participate in political discussion and debate, organize, and struggle against unjust authority.
Habermas's critical theory which focuses on communicative action also points to the increasingly important role of the media in politics and everyday life and the ways that corporate interests have colonized this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests. 
British Cultural Studies and the Birmingham School
The forms of culture described by the earliest phase of British cultural studies in the 1950s and early 1960s articulated conditions in an era in which there were still significant tensions in Britain and much of Europe between an older working class-based culture and the newer mass-produced culture whose models and exemplars were the products of American culture industries. The initial project of cultural studies developed by Richard Hoggart(1918-) , Raymond Williams (1921 -1988 , and E. P. Thompson (1924 Thompson ( -1993 attempted to preserve working class culture against onslaughts of mass culture produced by the culture industries. Thompson's historical inquiries into the history of British working class institutions and struggles, the defenses of working class culture by Hoggart 26 (1958) and Williams (1961) , and their attacks on mass culture were part of a socialist and working class-oriented project that assumed that the industrial working class was a force of progressive social change and that it could be mobilized and organized to struggle against the inequalities of the existing capitalist societies and for a more egalitarian artifacts. Through a set of internal debates, and responding to social struggles and 27 movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, the Birmingham group came to focus on the interplay of representations and ideologies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality in cultural texts, including media culture. They were among the first to study the effects of newspapers, radio, television, film, and other popular cultural forms on audiences. They also focused on how various audiences interpreted and used media culture in varied and different ways and contexts, analyzing the factors that made audiences respond in contrasting ways to media texts.
The now classical period of British cultural studies from the early 1960s to the early 1980s continued to adopt a Marxian approach to the study of culture, one especially influenced by Althusser and Gramsci. Yet although Hall (1980a) , Bennett (1982) In relation to psychoanalysis, theorists such as Simone de Beauvoir (1908 Beauvoir ( -1986 furthered the feminist theoretical project by famously arguing that women (and by extension, men) are made, not born. In The Second Sex (1952) she drew a critical distinction between sex and gender missed by Freud, wherein sex is biological and gender is constructed socially and politically. As such, gender becomes contingent, the product of a certain power relationship within cultural traditions. Nancy Chodorow by introducing the dimension of racism and race relations. Hill Collins (Harding, 2004) in particular theorizes a black feminist epistemology which emphasizes the centrality of the African American experiences as a source for producing new knowledge as well as powerful criticisms of the sexism and racism within a white, male dominated patriarchal society. Most importantly, bell hooks critiques both male patriarchy as well as white feminism for marginalizing issues of race, racism, and class. For hooks, class, race, and gender are integral factors in the constitution of subjectivity and must be discussed together in order to have a more comprehensive notion of the critique of representation 36 and of oppression. Other feminists such as Uma Narayan (1958-) (Harding, 2004) Third, postcolonial studies attempts to deconstruct Eurocentric representations of the cultural 'other'. Critics such as Edward Said (1935 Said ( -2003 have demonstrated the imperialist assumptions at work within the western canon of literature and art. He exposes how racist images of the 'exoticized' east legitimated European and United 37 States colonial occupations. Finally, Homi Bhabha (1949-) and Gayatri Spivak (1942-) search for forms of resistance in subversion and mimicry. These authors, heavily influenced by deconstruction, always foreground their analyses with an understanding that such resistance--far from the total revolution advocated by Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth (1961) --is itself informed by and inscribed within the very matrix of the colonizer's views of freedom, liberty, etc. As such hybridity (the constantly shifting and intersecting relationship between cultural, economic, and political systems within colonization) becomes a central issue for postcolonial theorists interested in the question of national culture, identity politics, and the deconstruction of reductive dichotomies that separate out the 'civilized' west from the 'primitive' east.
Conclusion
In conclusion we would advocate that critique must, as Hegel suggested, become familiar with its own historically conditioned past. Rather than support one theory over the other, we would also argue that a 'multiperspectival' approach to critique is necessary in order to account for all forms of political, economic, and social oppression, subjugation, and
exploitation. Thus we must analyze each theory of critique in terms of its strength and weaknesses, progressive moments and conservative limitations, and work towards a more robust theory of criticism that is capable of cognitively mapping the vast system of global capitalism that functions within and conditions a predominantly Eurocentric, patriarchal, white, heteronormative, male-dominated global economy and networked society.
